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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of monetary policy transparency on economic stability, when
economic agents are boundedly rational. I ﬁrst consider a simple class of microfunded general
equilibrium models with nominal rigidities and learning. Under a transparent monetary regime,
market participants have information about how monetary policy is conducted and use it when
forming their forecasts. The paper shows that under plausible assumptions about the model en-
vironment, a transparent implementation of simple policy rules improves stability under learning
dynamics. It is also shown that, independently of the degree of central bank transparency, the
Taylor Principle is generally not suﬃcient to guarantee robustness of the rational expectations
equilibrium to expectational mistakes by the central bank or the private sector.
The paper also attempts an evaluation of the beneﬁts of transparency using a calibrated
model of US data.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Monetary policy design is a diﬃcult task, given the lack of consensus about a ‘correct’ model of the
economy. Two main sources of model uncertainty are the monetary transmission mechanism and
the market expectations’ formation process. Recent monetary theory1 has proposed the adoption
of simple instrument rules, dictating that the interest rate should respond to deviations of inﬂation
and output gap from their targets. Simple rules are claimed to be ‘robust’ to uncertainty about
t h et r u em o d e l .
On one side, many studies have attempted to design an optimal simple rule that is robust to
diﬀerent hypothesis about the impact of monetary policy on the economy2. On the other side, a
growing literature on bounded rationality has focused on the robustness of simple policy rules to
small expectations mistakes3 on the part of central banks and the private sector.
A given policy rule is robust to expectational mistakes if it gives a satisfactory performance
also when expectations are out of the (rational expectations) equilibrium, as a result of a change
in policy or a structural change in the economy. The criterion used to evaluate the performance of
a rule is whether it induces stability under learning. Thus we are interested in whether economic
agents who correct their expectations over time, as new data are available, will converge to the
rational expectation equilibrium (REE).
This paper explores the eﬀects of central bank transparency on the performance of simple
policy rules. I consider the hypothesis that the way a given policy rule is implemented might
aﬀect its robustness to expectational mistakes. In particular, central banks’ transparency might
aﬀect economic stability: if market participants have access to some information about central
bank actions, this can improve their predictions and stabilize the economic system. Some degree
of transparency and credibility might improve the private sector’s learning process, aﬀecting the
stability under learning.
Nevertheless, knowing the central bank policy actions does not mean that market participants
fully understand the ‘true’ model of the economy, especially in the case of decentralized markets,
where agents ignore each others’ tastes, production possibilities and expectations. That implies that
even a well understood policy rule might lead to economic instability, where the agents forecasting
process does not converge to the REE.
Following Faust and Svensson (2000), I deﬁne transparency as the degree to which the central
bank’s intentions can be inferred by market participants. For example, a transparent central bank
should provide monetary policy reports that explain and motivate its policy choices and should
publish inﬂation and output forecasts, used for policy decisions.
1For example, see Woodford (2003).
2Among the others, Hansen and Sargent (2000) or Onatski and Stock (2000).
3See for example Bullard and Mitra (2002), Evans and Honkapohja (2002), Howitt (1992) and Preston (2002),
Sargent and Williams (2002), Sargent (1999).
2In the context of simple policy rules, I model transparency as the public’s knowledge about
the policy rule. In particular, knowledge about the form of the policy rule and about the main
variables to which the central bank is responding when the interest rate is set. Still, I allow for
the possibility that the central bank might not be fully transparent. This is captured by imperfect
knowledge about the coeﬃcients of the policy rule, i.e. how the interest rate reacts to the economic
variables. A discretionary element of policy (modelled as white noise) makes more diﬃcult for the
public to infer the policy coeﬃcients.
Current contribution to policy design in a bounded rationality framework assume that economic
agents learn by recursive updating of an unrestricted VAR. This approach is not suitable for the
analysis of transparency because it does not allow the agents to use prior information about the
monetary policy rule. In the paper, learning with unrestricted VAR corresponds to the case of no
transparency or secrecy on the part of the central bank. The agents have no information about the
central bank decision process.
I propose a framework where market participants have a model of the economy that includes
the monetary policy rule and its eﬀects on output and inﬂation. The agents estimate recursively
their model using recursive instrumental variable estimators. In order to study the conditions
for stability under learning in this framework, I apply the results from stochastic approximation
theory, elaborated by Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001), to study the
convergence properties of recursive simultaneous equation estimation.
In this paper monetary policy is conducted by setting the interest rate according to a Taylor rule.
The economy is described by a simple forward looking microfunded model with nominal rigidities,
on the lines of Woodford (2002) and Benhabib et al. (2001). Given the uncertainty about the
impact of monetary policy on the economy, I consider diﬀerent hypotheses. I ﬁrst analyze a version
of the model where monetary policy has immediate eﬀects on output and inﬂation. This is the
most common assumption in the literature, but empirical evidence shows that monetary policy has
little immediate eﬀect on real activity and inﬂation. For this reason, following Woodford (2002)
I consider a more general version of the model where there are delays in the eﬀects of monetary
policy. I assume that expenditures and pricing decisions are made in advance, and thus depend on
old information about the economic conditions.
I show that in the case of a monetary policy rule that reacts to current inﬂation and output
gap or in the case that expectations about current and future interest rates do not aﬀect output
gap and inﬂation, stability under learning is not aﬀected by transparency. This seems to imply
that some rules are destabilizing per se, independently of the way they are implemented. In other
words, instability occurs even if every agent in the economy understands how monetary policy is
conducted. In this case, even expected and fully credible changes in the policy rule lead the economy
to instability induced by self-fulﬁlling expectations. I also show that the cost channel of monetary
policy modiﬁes the stability properties of Taylor rule. For a Taylor rule to induce a learnable
equilibrium, the interest rate should react to some degree to the output gap, even in the case of
3perfect transparency of the central bank. This implies that the Taylor Principle, stating that a
Taylor rule is stabilizing if it reacts aggressively to deviations of the inﬂation rate from target, is
not a suﬃcient condition to guarantee stability. It also implies that determinacy of the mean state
variable solution of a model under rational expectations is not enough to guarantee the stability of
the equilibrium under learning, in contrast with the ﬁndings of McCallum (2002). A similar result
is found in Preston (2003), in a diﬀerent model environment.
Conversely, under plausible assumptions about the monetary transmission mechanism, I show
that lack of transparency can induce instability even if desirable policies are adopted.
In the second part of the paper I attempt an evaluation of the eﬀects of central bank trans-
parency on the volatility and persistence of inﬂation output and the interest rate. I also propose an
estimation approach for the monetary model with learning. The implementation is left for further
research.
The results of the paper might suggest an alternative explanation for the observed response of
the economy to a monetary policy shock observed in the US data. The response is more dramatic
in the 70’s and it is extremely reduced in the 90’s. This might be due to changes in the public’s
understanding of monetary policy, rather than changes in the policy rule.
The paper is organized as follows. The ﬁrst section introduces the model and discusses its
stability under Rational Expectations. The second and third sections describe the model and its
solution. In sections 4-6 I discuss the stability result under diﬀerent hypothesis about the model
environment. Finally, in section 7 I describe some simulation results and the plans for future
research.
2A S i m p l e M o d e l
I consider a simple model of the economy, on the lines of Woodford (2003) and Benhabib et al.
(2001). The model is fully forward-looking, explicitly microfunded and displays sticky prices. In
order to keep the analysis simple I abstract from capital accumulation. The economy is populated
by a continuum of identical consumers/producers.
Each agent j produces a diﬀerentiated good (Y j) in a monopolistically competitive market.
Assuming a ﬁxed capital stock, labor and money services are the production inputs. Therefore,
















t denotes nominal money balances and Pt is an index of the price level. In the paper
I also consider the case where money gives direct utility to the consumer, because it facilitates
transactions. The production function f satisﬁes the standard conditions. Each agent consumes
4a composite good C
j
t, obtained by some aggregation of each single diﬀerentiated goods produced.












where Yt is aggregate output, P
j
t is the price of good j and the function Dt is assumed to be
decreasing in the price and satisﬁes the following two conditions: Dt (1) = 1 and θt = D0
t/Dt < −1
for every t. The parameter θt, measuring the elasticity of demand is assumed to vary over time
according to an exogenous process. This implies time-varying mark-ups for the producers and
introduces a source for supply shocks in the economy.
The economy is represented by a continuum of consumers-producers that seek to maximize the








































t denotes nominal money balances held by agent j and Π∗ is the steady state gross inﬂation
rate. Also, U (.,.) is the utility function from consumption and money balances and V (.) denotes
the disutility from labor. Moreover, U (.,.) is assumed to be increasing, twice diﬀerentiable and
strictly concave and V (.) is increasing, twice diﬀerentiable and strictly convex. In particular, I
consider the case in which U (.,.) is non-separable in consumption and real money balances4.T h i s
might be considered the most empirically relevant case, given that the marginal beneﬁt of additional
real balances increases as consumption (i.e. total transactions) increases5.
The last term in (3) denotes the cost of changing the current price. Assuming γt =¯ γ (1 + θt) < 0
for every t implies price stickiness (but not sticky inﬂation). The choice of convex adjustment costs
follows Rotemberg (1982) and it is dictated by the necessity to keep the non-linear model as simple
as possible. The linearized solution of the model takes the same form that would be obtained if a
Calvo pricing scheme is used (even if the parameters have a diﬀerent interpretation). Notice that
the adjustment cost term has a plausible behavioral interpretation in an economic environment
where gross inﬂation is close to Π∗, which is the case I consider in the paper.
The expectation operator ˆ Ei
t−1 denotes the subjective beliefs of agent j about the probability
distribution of the model’s state variables. Given the assumption that the agents do not know the
true model of the economy, the "^" denotes non-rational expectations. Notice that agents take
decisions for time t consumption and production, on the basis of t − 1 information. This can be
interpreted in two ways: either the agents plan their consumption, production and asset holding in
advance or they act on the basis of old information.
4The case where the utility function is separable is the most analyzed in the literature about policy rule.
5For details, see Woodford (2002).
5I assume that ﬁnancial markets are incomplete, and the only non-monetary asset that is possible





























tdenotes the riskless bond, im
t denotes the interest paid on money balances and it denotes
the interest paid on the bond. Also Tt denotes lump-sum taxers from the government.
2.1 Monetary and Fiscal Policy







Mt−1 + PtGt − Mt
where Gt deﬁnes government expenditures. I further assume that Gt is an exogenous AR(1) process.
Monetary policy is conducted according to a simple interest rate rule. I consider two possible
ways of implementing the interest rule.
1. Quantity adjustments. The Central Bank decides the target interest rate and then implement
it trough quantity adjustment in the money supply. In this case, im
t is ﬁxed to zero.
2. Adjustments of the interest paid on the monetary base. In this case I assume that the central
bank changes im
t as the target interest rate is modiﬁed, in order to keep a constant spread:
i.e. ˆ ıt =ˆ ım
t .
The policy rule determines the interest rate as a function of the current state of the economy, or
estimates of it. In the course of the paper I consider diﬀerent rules that are commonly considered
in the literature. In order to keep the analysis simple, this paper does not consider inertial rules6.
This case would require a separate study. In its general form the policy rule can be expressed as
it =¯ ı + φπECB
t−1(πt − π∗)+φxECB
t−1 (xt − x∗)+ t (5)
where xt denotes the output gap, as deﬁned below. In order to keep the analysis simple, I do
not explicitly consider what decision process leads to a speciﬁcc h o i c eo ft h ep o l i c yc o e ﬃcients7.
Forecasts by the central bank, ECB
t−1,m i g h tb ed i ﬀerent from private sector’s. Notice that I consider
the hypothesis that the bank’s rule is ‘operational’ in the sense of McCallum (1999). Also,  t can
be seen as a control error or some discretionary component, modelled as white noise.
6See Woodford (2002).
7For example, the optimal non-inertial rules, under both commitment and discretion, in Giannoni and Woodford
(2002).
63M o d e l S o l u t i o n
The solution of the model gives a sequence of consumption, labor, and money balances that maxi-
mizes (3) subject to (4) and a market clearing condition. In equilibrium, agents will take identical
production, consumption and saving decisions. I further assume that they have the same beliefs
about the economy (even though they might not be aware of that). Appendix A describes the
model solution in both cases where money enters in the utility function or in the production func-
tion. Assuming that consumption, money and pricing decisions are predetermined t−1 periods in
advance, the log-linearized model is described by the following equations. The demand side of the
economy is
xt = −˜ σEPS
t−1
£
η1ˆ ıt − η2ˆ ım
t − πt+1 − η2
¡








where ˜ σ,η1 and η2 = η1 − 1 depend on the coeﬃcients of the demand for money and the utility
function. EPS
t−1 denotes the expectation operator for the private sector. Also, xt = ˆ Yt − ˆ Y e
t ,i st h e
output gap, deﬁned as output deviations from the eﬃcient level of output, obtained in the case of
fully ﬂexible prices and in the absence of mark-up shocks. Finally, ˆ rn
t is the natural rate of interest,
a s s u m e dt ob ee v o l v i n ga sa nA R ( 1 )p r o c e s s .
If monetary frictions are modeled by having money in the utility function, real money bal-
ances aﬀect intertemporal consumption decisions. As shown in (6), expected high interest rates
on nonmonetary assets, and therefore expected low money balances, stimulate consumption today
relatively to next period’s. Notice that this holds only in the case where the interest diﬀerential
between monetary and nonmonetary assets is allowed to vary. This is the case where the policy rule
is implemented through adjustment in the supply of money (in this caseˆ ım
t =0 ). If the central bank
keeps a ﬁxed spread between monetary and nonmonetary asset, then the IS equation is equivalent
to (6) with η1 =1and η2 =0 . Only the expected current interest rate on nonmonetary assets
aﬀects the evolution of the output gap. In the case of money in the production the IS equation is
equivalent to (6) with η1 =1and η2 =0 , independently of how monetary policy is implemented.
Independently of how money enters in the model, the key parameter that describes the demand
eﬀects of monetary policy is ˜ σ : it is proportional to the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution
of consumption. As shown in the Appendix, the value of ˜ σ is higher in the case of monetary frictions,
thus magnifying the eﬀects of interest rate changes on the output gap.
The supply side of the economy is described by the following Phillips curve
πt = EPS
t−1βπt+1 + κEPS
t−1 [ˆ xt + η3 (ˆ ıt −ˆ ım
t )] + ut (7)
where κ measures the inﬂation response to the output gap and η3 measures the supply-side eﬀects of
monetary policy. An increase in interest rates diﬀerentials increases the opportunity cost of holding
money and thus increases the marginal cost of production. Equation (7) with ˆ ım
t =0has the same
functional form of the supply curve obtained from a simple model including the cost channel of
7monetary policy8. The parameter that captures the size of the cost channel is η3:i ti sd i ﬀerent
from zero in both cases of money in the production function and money in the utility function9.
The equation includes a cost-push shock ut, that depends on shocks to the mark-up of ﬁrms.
The shock is assumed to be generated by an AR(1) process.
The model of the economy is given by equations (6), (7), and the policy rule (5). It can be
w r i t t e ni nm a t r i xt e r ma sf o l l o w s






t−1Vt+1 + A3Xt (8)















and ζt is a vector of i.i.d. shocks. In order to
close the model I need to specify how expectations are formed.
3.1 The Expectation Formation Mechanism: Methodology
In this paper I follow the “Euler Approach” to econometric learning, as deﬁn e di nE v a n s ,H o n k a p o -
hja and Mitra (2002) and widely used and discussed in Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and Marcet
and Sargent (1989). It predicts that agents’ behavior is based on equations (6) and (7), derived
from the Euler equations, under the assumption of possibly non fully rational expectations10.T h e
agents are modelled as econometricians. They are endowed with beliefs about the law of motion of
the main economic variables. Their Perceived Law of Motion (PLM) includes all the relevant vari-
ables and is asymptotically correctly speciﬁed. As a result, the agents will eventually learn to make
rational predictions, if the learning process converges to the Rational Expectations Equilibrium.
As noted in Preston (2002), the Euler equations are not the optimal decision rules given the
assumed beliefs and microfundations. In fact,
the agents should take into account not only the ﬂow budget constraint but also their intertem-
poral budget constraint. This results on decision rules that depend on inﬁnite horizon forecasts.
My choice is based on the analytical simplicity of the Euler approach. Nevertheless, the decision
rules of the agents converge asymptotically to the optimal decision rule, under the assumption that
their initial wealth is zero.
8See for example Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and Ravenna and Walsh (2003).
9Assuming money as a productive asset is a simple and coherent way to evaluate the cost channel of monetary
policy, given the evidence that the highest fraction of money demand comes from ﬁrms.
10A recent contribution by Preston (2002) proposes a diﬀerent approach where the agents decision rules depend on
long horizon forecasts. It would be possible to extend my analysis in that framework. This is left for future research.
8I assume that market participants are atomistic and they are not coordinated on some shared
belief on the model of the economy. Also, I assume that they cannot observe aggregate expectations
about the macroeconomic variables. As a consequence, their model of the economy cannot be the
true aggregate model represented by (6) and (7). Their Perceived Law of Motion (PLM) of the
economy might include contemporaneous variables, like the output gap and the interest rate, but
does not include aggregate expectations.
This implies that, even if the model is asymptotically correct; a) during the learning process
the agents’ model is misspeciﬁed; b) its coeﬃcients will not be policy invariant. Adopting a new
policy will require the agents to adjust their model, irrespective to their knowledge of how monetary
policy is conducted. No matter how precise it is the knowledge about the policy rule, the agents
are still uncertain about the economic environment and thus they cannot properly calculate the
eﬀects of the monetary policy on the main economic variables such as output, inﬂation and the
interest rate11. Still, once the learning process has converged the model delivers the same forecasts
a st h et r u em o d e l .
In conclusion, knowledge of the policy rule does not eliminate the problem of stability under
learning. It is then possible to evaluate whether transparency has eﬀects on the stability under
learning of a given policy rule.
4 The Model With Current Information
Ic o n s i d e rﬁrst the version of the model which is mostly used for policy analyses, including stability
under learning. Under the assumption of no delays, the model can be expressed in matrix notation
as
Vt = ˆ A1 + ˆ A2EPS
t Vt+1 + ˆ A3Xt (9)
for suitable matrices.
4.1 VAR Learning: The Case of No Transparency
As I mentioned in the section above, in the case of no transparency, the public is not given enough
reliable information to use the policy rule to predict interest rate movements and its impact on
output gap and inﬂation. In this case, I model the agents’ prediction process following Evans and
Honkapohja (2001) and Marcet and Sargent (1989). I assume that each agent has the same PLM
Vt = Ω0,t−1 + Ω1,t−1Xt + et (10)
11This is because the information available to the agents is not enough to recover all the policy-invariant parameters
that deﬁne the economy. In other words, the model that they estimate is still subject to the Lucas critique, since the
parameters change with the monetary policy rule.
9where output gap, inﬂation and the interest rate depend on exogenous shocks. Also, et denotes a
vector of perceived i.i.d. shocks. The PLM is linear and include all the variables that are included
in the MSV solution of the model. Thus the model is consistent with the REE. Nevertheless, it is
misspeciﬁed during the learning process. The agents estimate recursively the coeﬃcients of their
linear model using recursive least squares (RLS). They assume the model to have ﬁxed coeﬃcients.
The coeﬃcients are updated according to the following algorithm















, Rt is the precision matrix and δt is a decreasing sequence of gains,
satisfying certain properties12. The updating equation includes an observational i.i.d. error,ot that
makes the learning process non trivial. As it is well known from Evans and Honakapohja (2001),
stability of the REE under learning obtains if the E-Stability conditions are met. Inserting (10)
into (9) gives the Actual Law of Motion (ALM) of the economic system





. The E-Stability condition requires that the mapping between PLM and
ALM to be locally stable at the REE, where T (Ω∗)=Ω∗. It is apparent why during the learning
process the agents’ model is misspeciﬁed. The ALM implies a model with time-varyng coeﬃcients.
The PLM is a correctly speciﬁed model of the economy only asymptotically, if the learning process
converges to the REE.
The following proposition deﬁnes the conditions for learnability under reduced-form learning.
In order to obtain clear analytical results I impose assumptions on some of the parameters, that
are not contradicted by standard calibrations, as showed in Table I.
Table I
Woodford (2003) Calibration
σ =6 .3 κ =0 .024 β =0 .99 η1 =1 .56 η3 =0 .89 χ =0 .02
Clarida et al. (1999) Calibration
σ =1 κ =0 .3 β =0 .99 - - -
Proposition 1 Assume that
η3
˜ σ ≤ 1. Assume that the private sector’s learning process is described
by (10) and (11).
12See Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
10(i) Then the REE is stable under learning if and only if
κ(φπ − 1) + φx (1 − β) − η3κφx > 0 (12)
Proof. see Appendix B.
The proposition shows a ‘qualiﬁed’ version of the results obtained by Howitt (1992) and Bullard
and Mitra (2002) and Preston (2002), for the case of monetary frictions. If the policy rule is too
passive or it prescribes an excessive reaction to the output gap, then the REE is unstable under
learning. If the REE is unstable under learning, there will be self-fulﬁlling expectations leading to
potentially explosive behavior of output and inﬂation.
In the analysis above I have assumed that the agents do not have information concerning the
monetary policy rule. With knowledge about future policy actions the agents can improve their
forecasts and this might aﬀect the stability properties of a given policy rule. This amounts to asking
the following question: is a policy rule violating (12) inherently destabilizing or is it the way the
policy is implemented that aﬀects its performance?
4.2 A Transparent Central Banker
When agents have information about how monetary policy is conducted and they are willing to
use it to improve their forecasts. Consider the most plausible case where market participants know










where the constant captures the long-run objectives of the central bank, i.e. the inﬂation target,
and the coeﬃcients describe how aggressive the policy is in responding to inﬂation and output gap




can be interpreted as the
initial level of credibility of the central bank, depending on how close they are to the true parameter
values. The agents might use the information about the policy rule to improve their forecast of
inﬂation and output.
In order for this information to be useful for prediction, the agents need a model to identify
the eﬀects of monetary policy on output and inﬂation. Since, in a decentralized market, agents do
not have speciﬁc information about other market participants tastes and expectations, their model
does not include the average opinion and does not correspond to the true model. On the other
hand, it explicitly includes the eﬀects of monetary policy on output and inﬂation. The agents PLM










where each agent j can observe the current interest rate and the demand shock rn
t . The equation
for output gap takes into account the possible eﬀects of monetary policy on the current output gap,









where the agents take into account that monetary policy has its eﬀects on the inﬂation process
because it aﬀects the output gap. The equation includes also the cost-push shock. Aggregating
across diﬀerent agents, and using the fact that expectations are identical, it is possible to write the
PLM in a more compact notation
Γt−1Vt = B0,t−1 + B1,t−1Xt + et (16)
which gives a system of simultaneous equations. Notice that the last equation of the system,
corresponding to the interest rate, depends on the form of the policy rule.
Given that the agents estimate a model with the unique purpose of prediction, I should discuss
what are the incentives to use information about the policy rule. Assuming that the agents do not
take the into account the eﬀects of their learning process on the aggregate variables, if the model
is exactly identiﬁed, they should be indiﬀerent between reduced form and structural estimation13.
Nevertheless, the recursive updating of the estimator allows them to use prior information about
the coeﬃcients of the estimated policy rule, thus making structural estimation more suitable. In
the case of perfect transparency and credibility, the agents know the value of the policy coeﬃcients,
and the PLM (16) allows them to use this information for prediction. Notice also that by estimating
the policy rule (13) they actually estimate an equation that is well speciﬁed at any point in time,
and not only asymptotically, as it is the case for the other equations14.
The agents are assumed to estimate recursively the system (16). Least squares estimation
would lead to inconsistency. Hence, I assume that they update the coeﬃcients of their model
by using Recursive Instrumental Variables (RIV). In order for the model (16) to be estimated, it
needs to be identiﬁed, i.e. we need as many instruments as many endogenous variables. Recall
that an exogenous variable of the model can be used as an instrument if it is not included in the
equation. In (14) we have one endogenous variable, the interest rate, and one instrument available,
the cost-push shock ut.I n t h e i n ﬂation equation there is also one endogenous variable, and the
instrument available is the demand shock ˆ rn
t . Finally, estimation of the Taylor rule (13) requires
two instruments, since both xt and πt enter the equation. Both the demand and supply shocks can
be used as instruments, because they do not appear in the equation. Given the instruments, the
recursive version of the estimator can be showed to be15











13For example, Dhrymes (1978).
14In fact, it is well known that during the learning process the agents’ model is misspeciﬁed because the ALM has
time varying coeﬃcients. This does not not hold for the estimated Taylor rule.
15In order to simplify the convergence analysis I assume that the gain matrix ¯ R appears lagged in the updating
equation.
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t is the matrix gain associated to each single equation (with h = y,π,i respectively). Also
Qt =( I3 ⊗ Wt)








































where I assume, without loss of generality, that the agents know the matrix H. Inserting the PLM
in (9), we get the Actual Law of Motion






+ A3Xt + A4 t (18)
that can be re-written
Vt = ˜ T0 (θt−1)Wt + A4 t. (19)
Given (19), the REE equilibrium is deﬁned as the ﬁxed point of the map ˜ T (.), such that16
˜ T (θ∗)=θ∗.
Inserting (19) in (17) I obtain the following stochastic dynamical system
































The following Proposition describes the conditions for stability under learning.
Proposition 2 Assume that
η3
˜ σ ≤ 1. Assume that the private sector’s learning process is described
by (16) and (17).
(i) In the case where Ucm =0 . The REE is stable under learning if and only if (12) is Satisﬁed.
Monetary policy transparency does not aﬀect local stability under learning.
( i i )I nt h ec a s ew i t hUcm > 0, (or money enters in the production function), under Wood-
ford (2002) and Clarida et al. (1999) calibration, the stability condition is not aﬀected by policy
transparency.
(iii) Assume full transparency, i.e. each agents knows the coeﬃcients of the policy rule. The
stability conditions are unchanged.
Proof. see Appendix B.
The Proposition shows that under the current assumptions about the model of the economy
being transparent does not help. Notice that if Ucm =0expectations about the future interest
rate are not used for prediction. This does not mean that information about the policy rule is
not useful to forecast future output and inﬂation, since they depend on the future interest rate.
As stated in (ii), transparency does not help even if the agents need to predict the future interest
rate. This leads to the following conclusions. Condition (12) does not depend on the way the
monetary authority implements the policy rule. Even if every agent understands how monetary
policy is conducted, a policy rule that violates (12) would lead to economic instability. Instability
is determined by the fact that the agents in the economy are not coordinated on the REE, and do
not fully understand the true model of the economy.
More generally, this result seems to suggest that improved predictability does not necessarily
improve stability. Even full knowledge about the policy rule does not improve stability under
learning. Even if a fully credible central bank announces a policy rule that violates (12), the
outcome will be destabilizing. This conclusion suggests that some policy options are destabilizing
per se, without the possibility for the central bank to improve on their performance.
5 The general case with delays
As mentioned in the introduction, there is evidence from empirical studies and central bank practices
that the assumptions made in the previous section about the monetary transmission mechanism
and the policy rule are at odds with the facts. Considering the monetary transmission mechanism,
14VAR evidence from Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Boivin and Giannoni (2002) shows that
output and inﬂation respond to a monetary shock with lags. Concerning monetary policy rules,
Orphanides (2003) shows that the Federal Reserve makes active use of forecasts about current and
future values of inﬂation and output gap. The next section investigates the implications of these
assumptions on the eﬀects of central bank transparency.
5.1 The Case of a Non-Transparent Central Bank
As above, the agents only know the sets of variables that appear in the MSV reduced form solution
of the model under rational expectations and they conjecture a linear relationship between output,
inﬂation, interest rate and these variables. The central bank does not disclose information about
the relevant variables to which reacts, its forecasts or the policy rule coeﬃcients. Therefore, the
agents forecast current and future interest rates by using an unrestricted VAR, which the interest




where h = PSdenotes the aggregate PLM of the private sector and h = CB denotes the forecast
of the central bank. The following proposition describes the stability conditions under learning.
Proposition 3 Assume
η3
˜ σ ≤ 1. Given the model (8) and the PLM (21).
(i) The REE is locally stable under learning if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
κ(φπ − 1) + (1 − β)φx − κη3φx > 0 (22)
and










+[ κ˜ σ − (1 − β)](2 − β)
[1 + κη3]˜ σ
(23)
(ii) there exist learning equilibria, where inﬂation ﬂuctuates around the inﬂation target, even in
the case (12) is satisﬁed and the REE is locally determinate and unique.
Proof. see Appendix C.
Predetermined economic decisions and less information about the state of the economy aﬀect
the stability conditions under learning. The choice of φx becomes crucial for stability. If the policy
rule reacts too much to the output gap (22) is violated and instability occurs. But (23) states
that the policy rule should react to some degree to the output gap. The stability condition is
modiﬁed if we consider the model with small real balances eﬀects (i.e. η3 small). In this case, (22)
approximates the Taylor principle but (23) requires a positive value for ˆ φx,e v e ni fη3 =0 .U s i n g
the Woodford calibration with φπ =2 , ˆ φx ' 0.05. Using the Clarida et al. calibration ˆ φx ' 0.9.
Figure 1 shows the case for this latter calibration.
15Condition (22) is represented by the solid line, while condition (23) is represented by the dotted
line. In the area below the solid line the equilibrium is determinate, under rational expectations.
The shaded area shows the combination of policy parameters for which we obtain stability, if the
central bank is not transparent. It is immediate to see that determinacy is obtained for a wider set
of parameters.
Also, from (ii) in the proposition we know that for values of φx that is close to the bifurcation
value, the learning process induces additional ﬂuctuations in inﬂation, output and interest rate,
even in the case of local learnability of the REE. Notice that under rational expectations the unique
equilibrium is the inﬂation target. It is the learning behavior that generates other equilibria where
inﬂation ﬂuctuates. In the next section I consider whether some degree of transparency can avoid
these outcomes or if they inherently depend on the learning process.
Summing up, in order to get stability (at least locally) the central bank would need to increase
its response to the output gap. But we know that central banks do not have accurate data about
this variable, and that excessive response to this variable might lead to destabilizing policies17.
Hence, on one side the central bank has to respond aggressively to the output gap, in order to
coordinate expectations. On the other side this might not be an option, because of the scarce
reliability of output gap estimates. In the next section, I consider whether improved transparency
can promote economic stability.
5.2 The Case of a Transparent Central Banker
In this case, I assume that the agents make use of information about the central bank decision
making. The central bank is assumed to be more transparent about its policy decisions. For
example, it is clear about its goals and how to achieve them and it publishes its forecasts about the
current inﬂation rate and output gap. This means that these forecasts are in the agents’ information
set, at the time they form their expectations. On the other side, I allow for the possibility that
the bank is not fully transparent, i.e. it has an incentive to misrepresent the economic conditions.
Hence, I consider the possibility that the central bank reports its forecast with an i.i.d. error, i.e.
ˆ ECB
t−1πt = ECB
t−1πt + eπ,t−1 and ˆ ECB
t−1xt = ECB
t−1xt + ex,t−1. The agents are assumed to estimate over
time the following policy rule
it = ψ0,t−1 + ψπ,t−d ˆ ECB
t−1πt + ψx,t−1 ˆ ECB
t−1xt + et (24)
which, assuming a potential i.i.d. observation errors, can be estimated consistently using recursive
instrumental variables, by regressing it−1 on ˆ ECB
t−2dπt−1 and ˆ ECB
t−2dxt−1.A tt h ee n do fe a c hp e r i o d
the agents update their estimate of the Taylor rule according to







17See, Orphanides (2001) and Bullard and Eusepi (2003).

















Notice that, in order to form expectations at time t, the agents are assumed to use t−1 estimates of
the coeﬃcients. I also allow the agents to use a less eﬃcient but simpler and more robust learning
rule, i.e. the Stochastic Gradient Algorithm. The updating equation is deﬁned as follows






The model (8) can be re-expressed as follows
˜ Vt = B0 + B1ψ0
t−1ECB
t−1 ˜ Vt + B2EPS
t−1˜ Vt + B3ψ0
t−1ECB
t−1 ˜ Vt+1 + B4EPS
t−1˜ Vt+1 + B5Xt−1 + ˜ ζt (27)
it =¯ ı + φπECB
t−1(πt − π∗)+φxECB
t−1 (xt − x∗)+ t




. Notice that I use the fact that the private sector can observe the central
























equality can be justiﬁed in two ways; a) the central bank publishes forecasts of current and future
inﬂation, b) the central bank makes available its forecasting procedures. In both ways, the bank
makes it easier for the public to predict its future policy moves.
Since contemporaneous variables dot not enter in the true model, the agents estimate the
behavior of output gap and inﬂation by using unrestricted VAR estimation. Their PLM is therefore
˜ Vt = ˜ Ωh
0,t−1 + ˜ Ωh
1,t−1Xt−1 + et (28)
where, again, h = PS,CB.T h e c o e ﬃcients are updated using either RLS or SG. The following
Proposition describes local stability under learning, under RLS and SG learning. To simplify the
analysis I assume that the central bank and the private sector use the same learning rule.
Proposition 4 Consider the case Ucm =0 .
(i) In the case of Recursive Instrumental Variable or RLS learning, some degree of transparency
implies REE stability, provided that the Taylor Principle is satisﬁed: full transparency is NOT
needed for stability. The REE is locally unique;
(ii) In the case of SG learning, perfect transparency implies REE stability, provided that the
Taylor Principle is satisﬁed. In the case of partial transparency stability is achieved provided the
Taylor principle is satisﬁed and the eigenvalues of Mx˜ Ω∗0 are positive, where Mx = Elimt→∞XtX0
t.
Consider the case Ucm > 0 (or money in the production function).
17(iii) Transparency implies that the set of locally learnable Taylor rules is larger than in the case
of no transparency; Nevertheless, pure inﬂation targeting leads to instability and learning equilibria.










As β → 1 condition (29) becomes also necessary.
Proof. see Appendix C.
The result shows that under a more plausible model environment transparency matters. It is
important to remark that full transparency is not needed for stability. That is what makes the
result appealing, given that full transparency (i.e.  t is observable by the public and no errors in
expectations) is not observed in reality and it is not advocated by monetary theory, as showed in
Faust and Svensson (2002).
Nevertheless, including expectations in the policy rule and having the agents taking decisions
based on older information restricts the set of stabilizing policy rules, as showed in (29). The
central bank needs to set φx > 0 to guarantee stability. Even a fully transparent policy violating
(29) would be destabilizing, as long as the agents have imperfect information about the economic
environment. Lack of transparency has the eﬀect of increasing the policy rules that do not induce
instability under learning. Condition (29) is expressed in terms of the two key structural parameters
of the model: ˜ σ and η3. If the demand channel of monetary policy is much stronger than the
supply channel, stability can be achieved by choosing relatively low values of φx,w h i c hm i g h tb e
desirable, given the poor information available about the output gap. Estimates of η3 in Ravenna
and Walsh (2003) vary from 1.3 to around 5, indicating that a too low response to the output gap
might lead to instability for plausible parameter values. Consider the following example. Assume
φπ =2, η3 =0 .89 (or 2) and the other parameters at benchmark values. Then, for φx > 0.004
(0.015) the REE is locally stable under learning. The Taylor rule prescribes a coeﬃcient much
higher than this value. Nevertheless, the central bank should choose φx much higher than 0.004,
given that for values close to this, the learning behavior generates extra volatility in the main
variables. Numerical simulations show that choosing φx > 0.13 guarantees a monotone response of
the economy to economic disturbances. This is very close to the coeﬃcient of the Taylor, which
is φx =0 .5/4. Figures 2 and 3 show the response of output and inﬂation after a positive demand
shock. In ﬁgure 2, which shows the case of φx =0 .13,i n ﬂation increases as the output gap increases
and it is promptly reduced. In ﬁgure 3, with φx =0 .05, the increase in the output gap is followed
by an initial increase in inﬂation and an oscillatory adjustment of the two variables. Notice that
in the latter case the ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and output gap are more pronounced18.N o t i c et h a t
18The Figures show simulation of the ODE described in the text and in the appendix.
18if (29) is satisﬁed the only equilibrium under learning is the REE, by the same argument used for
the previous proposition.
Finally, notice that again determinacy of the MSV under rational expectations is not suﬃcient
to induce stability under learning, even in the case where agents are informed about the policy rule.
This results is in line with Preston (2003) and in contrast with McCallum (2002).
The results also show that if the public and the central bank update their information less
eﬃciently, than even partial degrees of transparency can aﬀect economic stability. Simulations
show that SG learning does not induce instability, for plausible parameter values, but it slows
down considerably the learning process, thus increasing substantially the volatility of the economic
variables.
Concluding, the way a policy is implemented has eﬀects on its stability under learning. A policy
rule might be under performing not because the rule is inherently destabilizing, but because of the
way it is implemented.
For completeness, the following Proposition discusses the performance of other policy rules
currently analyzed in the literature. In particular, a policy rule responding to private sector expec-
tations might not solve the problem of instability, at least for this class of policy rules.
Proposition 5 Assume that private sector’s decisions are taken with t−1 information and Ucm =
0.
(i) if the central bank reacts to current inﬂation and output gap, transparency does not aﬀect
local stability under learning;
C o n s i d e rt h ec a s eo fn ot r a n s p a r e n c y .
(ii) A policy rule of the form: it = φπEh
t−1πt+σ−1rn
t ,w i t hh = PS,CB leads to a non-learnable
REE;






without loss of generality that ρr = ρu =0. Then the stability conditions under learning are the
same as in Proposition (3). In particular, if φx =0the REE is non-learnable for any parameter
value.
C o n s i d e rt h ec a s eo fs o m ed e g r e eo ft r a n s p a r e n c y ;
(iv) the rules above are stable under learning, provided the Taylor Principle is satisﬁed.
Proof. see Appendix C.
6 When transparency matters. Comments.
The analysis in the previous sections shows that two conditions need to be veriﬁed in order for
transparency to aﬀect local stability under learning. First, agents need to forecast the current
or the future interest rate, in order to take consumption or production decisions. Even though
19knowledge of the policy rule helps predicting future output and inﬂation, this does not alter the
stability conditions under learning. Second, the central bank also needs to use forecast in order
to take interest rate decisions. In the case where the bank reacts to current output and inﬂation,
knowledge about the policy rule doe not change local stability under learning. This is because
the learning process of the agents does not aﬀect directly the interest rate dynamics. Hence, the
unrestricted VAR coeﬃcients corresponding to the interest rate equation converge for any parameter
value. In other words, from the proofs in the Appendix, the characteristic equation of the Jacobian
can be written as
P(λ)=( 1+λ)
¡
λ2 + a1λ + a0
¢
where the eigenvalue corresponding to the interest equation is equal to−1 for any parameter value.
It is obvious that under these conditions knowing the policy rule does not aﬀect local stability
after learning, even though it might have welfare improving eﬀects in reducing overall volatility.
Concluding, necessary and suﬃcient condition for transparency to matter is a) the central bank
responding to forecasts (possibly diﬀerent from the private sector’s and b) the market forecasting
the interest rate.
It is also worth mentioning that the response of the economy to a shock would be diﬀerent, for
empirically plausible parameter values, whether the market understands the policy rule or not. In
the case of transparency the economy converges back to the steady state monotonically, even though
the eﬀects on inﬂation are likely to be persistent. In the case of no transparency the convergence is
oscillatory, with possible negative eﬀects on welfare. I leave a more complete analysis of these eﬀects
to further research. The following section attempts a numerical evaluation of the eﬀects of lack
of transparency with a model estimated on US data. Simulations show that under the Woodford
calibration and a standard Taylor rule, the behavior of the economy under full transparency can
hardly be distinguished by the REE. Lack of transparency instead lead to undesired ﬂuctuations.
7 Monetary Policy Transparency and Macroeconomic Performance
7.1 Monetary Shocks and the Beneﬁts of Transparency: Preliminary Simula-
tion Results
As mentioned above, lack of transparency aﬀects economic stability also in the case where the REE
is locally stable under learning. If the monetary authority responds with suﬃcient aggressiveness
to the output gap, it can prevent self-fulﬁlling inﬂation or deﬂation, but lack of transparency still
aﬀects the way the economy responds to shocks. In order to give a quantitative impact of these
eﬀects, I consider an artiﬁcial economy, calibrated using Woodford’s estimates. In order to evaluate
quantitatively the eﬀects of transparency for a particular economies, we would need an estimated
of the structural parameters and the shock disturbances aﬀecting the economy. This analysis is
performed in the sections below. This preliminary simulations are conducted including only the
policy shock.
20I consider a more general Taylor tule with interest smoothing. The rule can be written as
it =¯ ı + ρit−1 +( 1− ρ)
£
φπECB
t−1 (πt − π∗)+φxECB
t−1 (xt − x∗)
¤
+  t (30)
In fact, Bullard and Mitra (2002) show that interest smoothing has a stabilizing eﬀect on the
economy. The simulations below show that even in this case lack of transparency has a considerable
eﬀect on the dynamic of output, inﬂation and interest rate. In the simulations I assume ρ =0 .7.
The following ﬁgures show that also in the case of local stability under learning, lack of transparency
have important consequences of the dynamics of inﬂation. The only sizable shock that I consider is
the monetary shock  t. I also include i.i.d. rn and ut shocks with negligible standard deviation, in
order to make the learning process nontrivial. I assume that σ  =0 .0025,σr =0 .0001,σu =0 .0001.
I further assume that the agents use the Stochastic Gradient algorithm to update their coeﬃcients.
The simulations start with the economy at its REE. I do not assume structural changes in the
parameters. Fluctuations from learning depend on the constant revision of the agents’ estimates.
It is assumed that market participants expect changes in policy and other structural parameters
so that they update their estimates using constant gain algorithms, where δt = δ.
7.1.1 Learning Dynamics
Assuming a ﬁxed gain algorithm has the implication that the matrix of coeﬃcients Ωt described
above does not converge to the REE Ω∗. This because learning becomes a persistent process The
agents expect structural changes in their model and therefore discount past observations and keep
updating their estimates as new observations are available. Nevertheless, provided the gain δt = δ
is ’small’, results from Benviste, Metivier and Priouret (1993) show19 that the matrix of coeﬃcient
converges to a time-invariant Gaussian distribution, centered in Ω∗. The variance of the distribution
tends to zero as the gain tends to zero. Hence the the stochastic process generated by the model
is asymptotically stationary, for large t. T h i sa l l o w su st ou s et h ee s t i m a t i o nm e t h o dd e s c r i b e d
below. Also, the asymptotic behavior of the estimated coeﬃcients is a source of extra volatility
and ﬂuctuations in the economic variables, with respect to the case of RE.
7.1.2 Simulation Results
In the simulations I use a benchmark case where φπ =1 .5,φ x =0 .5/4 and δ =0 .05. I then consider
the eﬀects of, a) increasing the gain to 0.1 and b) decreasing the coeﬃcient of the output gap to
0.2/4.
Simulation results show that, under the benchmark calibration, if the central bank is fully
transparent and credible the dynamics of inﬂation under learning is virtually identical to the REE.
This result resembles the ﬁnding of Williams (2002). Instead, lack of transparency implies more
19See also Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
21volatility and persistence in the inﬂation process. The tables below reports more speciﬁc results on
the eﬀects of transparency.
Table II
φx =0 .5/4;δ =0 .05 REE Transparency No Transparency
σ (x) 1.7109 1.7118 2.1272
σ (π) 0.2451 0.2456 0.3825
σ (i) 1.0707 1.07118 1.1595
corr(xt,x t−1) 0.3548 0.3574 0.5193
corr(πt,πt−1) 0.3455 0.3516 0.7022
corr(it,i t−1) 0.3553 0.3580 0.4518
The results are mean values, obtained by simulating the economy for 2000 times. Each time the
length of the simulation is 2000 periods. Notice how both standard deviation and autocorrelation
of the variables increase, with respect of the REE. On the other hand, an higher gain also increases
both standard deviation and volatility.
Table III
φx =0 .5/4;δ =0 .1 REE Transparency No Transparency
σ (x) 1.7109 1.7122 2.5005
σ (π) 0.2451 0.2463 0.5157
σ (i) 1.0707 1.0714 1.2570
corr(xt,x t−1) 0.3548 0.3574 0.5995
corr(πt,πt−1) 0.3455 0.3559 0.8277
corr(it,i t−1) 0.3553 0.3581 0.5307
Table IV
φx =0 .2/4;δ =0 .05 REE Transparency No Transparency
σ (x) 2.3728 2.3727 3.0792
σ (π) 0.3741 0.3741 0.6039
σ (i) 1.1000 1.0999 1.2869
corr(xt,x t−1) 0.4165 0.4163 0.6010
corr(πt,πt−1) 0.4119 0.4124 0.7479
corr(it,i t−1) 0.4167 0.4165 0.5707
22This might suggest an alternative explanation for the higher volatility and persistence of inﬂa-
tion, at business cycle frequencies, during the 70’s. Clarida, et al. (1999) and Boivin and Giannoni
(2002) among the others claim that high ﬂuctuations in the pre-Volker were due to a too passive
Taylor rule. This implies an indeterminate REE equilibrium and thus undesired ﬂuctuations. This
view could be questioned on two grounds.
First, the analysis above seems to suggest that even allowing for perfect knowledge of the policy
rule, the indeterminate REE associated to a passive policy rule is not going to be learnable. This
rises the question of the plausibility of this equilibrium (unless one would regard the rising inﬂation
in the 70s as a the non-stationary outcome of a non learnable REE).
Second, Orphanides (2003), using real time data, shows that the Taylor rule has been active in
the post war period. If this is a plausible description of US monetary policy, then no indeterminate
equilibrium would exist.
Assume that in the pre-Volker era the market did not properly understand monetary policy
decisions, while from the 80’ the public have spent more resources to analyze Fed behavior and
Fed have become increasingly transparent about its decisions (especially since the 90s’). Then the
results shown above seem to suggest an alternative explanation for undesired ﬂuctuations. A proper
evaluation of this hypothesis should be left to further research20.
7.2 Research in Progress. What are the Beneﬁts from Transparency: an Ap-
plication to US data
In this section I propose a method to estimate a monetary model of the US economy and attempt
an evaluation of the beneﬁts from central bank transparency. It has been argued that in the last 10
years the Federal Reserve has increased its degree of transparency towards the market. It would be
of interest to evaluate whether central bank’s transparency played a role in the good performance
of the US economy over the last decade. In the sequel, I estimate a model of the US economy,
assuming that agents learn about the economic environment using the recursive learning algorithms
described above.
I estimate the model using quarterly data for US inﬂation, output and interest rate21 for the
1984-2002, assuming perfect transparency of the Federal Reserve. In other words, I assume that
market participants incorporate the Fed’s reaction function in their econometric models. Subse-
quently, I run counterfactual simulations of the estimated model, assuming that the bank is not
transparent about its policy decisions. I then analyze its eﬀects on the volatility and persistence
of inﬂation, output and interest rate. The aim of the simulation exercise is to quantify the eﬀects
of a non-transparent monetary policy, leaving unchanged the other structural characteristics of the
economy, that is: 1) the policy rule, 2) the structural disturbances, 3) the parameters of demand
and supply curves.
20For example, the model should be evaluated including realistic assumptions on the shock processes.
21To be added.
23As a last step, I estimate the model using the sample from 1964-1979. Since in that period
the Fed was secretive about its policy decisions, I estimate the model under the assumption of
no transparency. By comparing the estimates with the ones previously obtained with the sample
1984-2002, I attempt an evaluation of the factors that most contributed to the increased volatility
and persistence in the macrovariables in that sample, with respect to the most recent years. The
next section describes brieﬂy the model used and the estimation method.
7.3 A model of the US economy
In order to estimated the model, I consider a more detailed model of the economy. I use a version of
the model with habit formation and inﬂation indexation, as in Boivin and Giannoni (2002), in order
to account for the observe inertia in output and inﬂation. More precisely, with habit formation the
IS equation becomes
ˆ yt+1 = −¯ σEt−1 (it+1 − πt+2)+νyˆ yt − Et−1ˆ yt+1 +( 1+βνy)Et−1ˆ yt+2 − βνyEt−1ˆ yt+3 + dt (31)
where ˆ yt denotes log deviation of output from its steady state value and dt is the "demand" shock.
The reduced-form parameters ¯ σ and νy denote interest rate sensitivity to the expected interest rate
and the degree of inertia in output dynamics. They are function of the deep parameters of the
model; details can be found in Boivin and Giannoni (2002). Notice also that the timing assumptions
are diﬀerent from the simplest version of the model. The information set of the agents is discussed
more precisely below. The Phillips curve can be expressed as
πt+1 = νππt + κωEtˆ yt+1 − κEtˆ yt+2 − κEtit+1 +¯ cEtπt+2 − νπ (1 + β)Etπt+1 − βEtπt+1 + st (32)
where ¯ c =[ β(1 + νπ)+κ +1 ] . Again, a precise deﬁnition of the parameters ω and κ can be found
in Boivin and Giannoni. The parameter νπ measures in this case the degree of inﬂation inertia.
The latter depends on what proportion of past inﬂation in incorporated in current prices by non-
optimizing ﬁrms. Notice also that the two shocks st and dt are predetermined at time t and follow
independent AR(1) processes. Finally, the Taylor rule is
ˆ ıt = φπEtπt+2 + φyEtˆ yt+1 + ρ1ˆ ıt−1 + ρ2ˆ ıt−2 +  t (33)
where the central bank reacts to expected future inﬂation and output.
Deﬁne the vector Zt+1 =
h
πt+1 ˆ yt+1 dt st ˆ ıt
i0






CijEt−j ¯ Zt+i + D1 ¯ Zt + D2ζt (34)




and ζt denotes a vector including the monetary policy shock and the
i.i.d shocks of the demand and supply shocks. As above the agents learn about the economy over
time. Their model is consistent with the MSV solution of the model under rational expectations.
7.3.1 Information Set and Timing
In order to keep the analysis simple and minimize departures from the RE benchmark, I make
convenient timing assumptions so that every agents in the economy estimate the same model,
independently of the information set used to take decisions and form expectations. In fact, consumer
and producers are assumed to have diﬀerent information sets, as it is clear from (31) and (32). The
latter assumption is made to reconcile the model’s impulse responses to a monetary shock with
the estimated VAR impulse responses for US data22. More precisely I assume that consumers
and producers update the estimates of their model at the end of period t +1with the following
information set
St+1 = {πt−j+1, ˆ yt−j+1,ˆ ıt−j,d t−1−j,s t−1−j,  t−j}j≥0
Notice that also the consumers observe the monetary policy shock  t and ˆ ıt at the end of period
t+1, but only after forming expectations and choosing their consumption levels. Consumers and
producers take their decisions at the beginning of each period. Consumers are assumed not to
observe  t and ˆ ıt, while producers do. That explains the diﬀerent timing in the expectations
operator. Furthermore, I assume that neither consumers nor producers observe dt and st at the
end of period t +1 . This hypothesis makes the learning procedure non-trivial, without the need
to assume observational shocks in the equations. Finally, the central bank is assumed to estimate
its model before observing dt and st,w h i l ei ts e t st h ei n t e r e s tr a t ea tt i m et with all the available
information. The informational advantage attributed to the central bank is consistent with the
VAR identiﬁcation and can be defended in the light of recent evidence of the better performance
of the Fed forecast with respect to those of the private sector.
7.3.2 The Actual Law of Motion
Under the above timing assumptions all the agents estimate the same model (which at the REE
coincides with the MSV solution). Each period the agents run the following regressions23 using a
ﬁxed gain stochastic gradient algorithm
ˆ yt+1 = ω11,t+1πt + ω12,t+1ˆ yt + ω13,t+1ˆ ıt−1 + ω14,t+1ˆ ıt−2 + ω15,t+1dt−1 + ω16,t+1st−1
πt+1 = ω21,t+1πt + ω22,t+1ˆ yt + ω23,t+1ˆ ıt−1 + ω24,t+1ˆ ıt−2 + ω25,t+1dt−1 + ω26,t+1st−1 + ω27,t+1 t
22See Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Boivin and Giannoni (2002) for details.
23I assume implicitely that the agents know the long run values of the main variables.
25and use them, together with the policy rule (33) to form expectations. In the case of a non
transparent policy regime, consumers and producers estimate an additional equation for the interest
rate
ˆ ıt = ω31,t+1πt + ω32,t+1ˆ yt + ω33,t+1ˆ ıt−1 + ω34,t+1ˆ ıt−2 + ω35,t+1dt−1 + ω36,t+1st−1 + ω37,t+1 t.
Substituting the expectations back in (34) I obtain the ALM of the system, which gives
¯ Zt+1 = T1 (Ωt) ¯ Zt + T2(Ωt)ζt (35)
where T1,T 2 deﬁne the mapping between PLM and ALM. This gives a model with time-varying
coeﬃcients. The dynamics under learning is described in the next section. In order to analyze the
behavior of the model under diﬀerent assumptions about central bank transparency I ﬁrst estimate
the model, under the assumption of perfect credibility. The next section describes the detail of the
estimation procedure.
7.4 Estimating the Model
I estimate the model using simulated quasi-maximum likelihood24 (SQML). I estimate a reduced-
f o r mV A Rw i t hU Sd a t ao ni n ﬂation, deviations of output from a linear trend and interest rate. I use
t h es a m ed a t a s e t 25 as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). The estimated VAR provides information
about the lag structure that gives the best ﬁt to the data. I also calculate the likelihood function
at the estimated coeﬃcients. This latter informations is not used for the model’s estimation, but
it is needed in order to perform tests.
This method, relying on numerical simulations of the model’s dynamic behavior, allows to
conduct formal statistical inference in nonlinear dynamic economic models as that one described in





of length S + p for a given set of the model’s structural parameter β. The vector ˜ Zs(β) includes
















where LS is the quasi-log-likelihood function. Notice that the structure of the VAR is the same as
the one used for the US data. Finally, at the third step, given the actually observed time series
{xt}
T
t=−(p−1) , the SQML estimator b βT is obtained solving the following problem:
24See, among the others, Smith A.A.(1993).
25Note to be added.









In particular, the conditional density at the basis of the quasi-log-likelihood function is given by:
f( ¯ Zt, ¯ Zt−1,;θ) ≡− 1/2log(det(DD0)) − 1/2ε0
t(DD0)−1εt
where ˜ Zt = C ˜ Zt−1 +˜ εt, the vector of innovations ˜ εt is assumed to be i.i.d. normally distributed
with covariance matrix DD0 and D is lower triangular. The validity of this approach is based on
the following two assumptions: ﬁrst, the processes xt and ˜ Zs(β) are stationary and ergodic, and
second, there exists a unique set of structural parameters β0 such that the actual data xt and the
simulated process ˜ Zs(β0) are drawn from the same distribution. The ﬁrst assumption implies that,
before performing the second step, it is necessary to ensure the stationarity of ˜ Zs(β) by simulating
the data for a large number of periods and then employ only the last part of the process for the
estimation. The asymptotic stationarity of the model-generated data is guaranteed by the fact that
the coeﬃcients of the learning model with ﬁxed gain algorithm converge to an invariant distribution,
as mentioned in the section above.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
The paper shows that transparency matter for monetary policy design. I consider the case where
a class of policy rules are evaluated for their robustness to forecasting mistakes of the market
participants. I show that in a model where monetary policy has immediate eﬀects on aggregate
activity and inﬂation, knowledge about the policy rule does not enhance the stability of the economic
system.
In the more empirically plausible case where expenditure and pricing decisions are predeter-
mined, and therefore monetary policy aﬀects the economy with delays, a transparent implementa-
tion of policy rule is crucial for the stability of the economic system. Lack of transparency might
generate instability to forecasting mistakes and other equilibria generated by the learning behavior.
A more transparent implementation of the rule instead guarantees stability of the unique REE,
provided the central bank reacts to some degree to the output gap.
Finally, the paper proposes a method to estimate the learning model with simulated quasi-
maximum likelihood methods.
Future research should address the case of inertial policy rule and the role of transparency
in this case. Also, in this paper I model delays in the eﬀects of monetary policy with lagged
expectations. The role of transparency on learnability should be investigated in the case where
delays are captured by lagged variables.
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t =(Bt + Mt)/Pt denotes real wealth and the term
it−1−im
t−1
Πt is the opportunity cost
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where λt is the Lagrangian multiplier. Diﬀerentiating with respect to P
j
t ,i m p o s i n gasymmetric












(Yt − Gt)(1+θt) − λtθt+
−γt (Πt − Π∗)Πt + βγt (Πt+1 − Π∗)Πt+1
#
=0 (37)
where θt = D0



















Substituting for λt in (37) gives
(Πt − Π∗)Πt = βE
j

























f0 (ht,m t)Uc (Yt − Gt,m t)
(40)
28is the average real marginal cost and µt = θt/(1 + θt) is the desired mark up. Last, the f.o.c.
with respect to assets and money balances are
E
j








which gives the consumption Euler equation, and
E
j

















which gives (implicitly) a money demand function for the consumer. There is also an implicit
















9.1 The Linearized Model
9.1.1 Money in the Utility Function
As mentioned in the introduction, I consider separately the case of money in the utility function
and money in the production function. In both cases the pricing equation () can be linearized to
get





is a measure of the degree of price stickiness. Notice that the linearization is a good approximation
of the non-linear model only for small values of inﬂation.
In the case of money in the utility function, the real marginal cost is
st =
V 0(f−1 (Yt))
f0 (f−1 (Yt))Uc (Yt − Gt,m t)
(45)










¡¯ Y − ¯ G, ¯ m
¢
Ucc
¡¯ Y − ¯ G, ¯ m
¢ ¯ Y
> 0
is the intertenporal elasticity of substitution of consumption
χ =
Ucm




¡¯ Y − ¯ G, ¯ m
¢ > 0
which measures the marginal utility of extra consumption, as real balances change
ωw =




V 0 ¡¯ Y
¢ > 0






deﬁnes the elasticity of the marginal product of labor with respect to output. Finally, ω =
ωw + ωp.




















Linearizing the money demand gives
ˆ m
j




t−1 (ˆ ıt −ˆ ım
t ) (48)
where I use the fact that each agent knows his consumption at time t, when deciding the amount
of money. where ηy > 0,ηi > 0 denote the elasticity of money demand with respect to income and
the nominal interest rate. The coeﬃcients can be shown to be
ηy =
µ
χc + ¯ ∆σ−1




1 − ¯ ∆





¡¯ Y − ¯ G, ¯ m
¢ ¯ Y
Uc








¡¯ Y − ¯ G, ¯ m
¢
30Substituting (48) in (47), I get
ˆ c
j




η1 (ˆ ıt −ˆ ım
t ) − πt+1 − η2
¡








where η1 =( 1 + χηi) > 1, η2 = η1 − 1 > 0,a n d˜ σ = σ
(1−χσηy) >σ . Assuming that the
agents understand that their future consumption depend on aggregate output26,i . e .t h a tC
j
t+1 =
Yt+1 − Gt+1, then their consumption decisions depend on their expectations about future output,
inﬂation, interest rate and government expenditures. Imposing equilibrium in the goods market
and aggregating over the agents I obtain the IS equation with real money balances eﬀects
xt = −˜ σEt−1 [η1ˆ ıt − η2ˆ ım
t − πt+1 − η2 (ˆ ıt −ˆ ım
t ) − ˆ rn
t ]+Et−1xt+1 (49)
where xt = ˆ Yt − ˆ Y e
t , is the output gap, expressed as output deviations from the eﬃcient level
ˆ Y e
t . Following Woodford (2003), the eﬃcient level of output can be deﬁned by
s(Y e
t ,m t,G t)=¯ µ−1 (50)
Notice that markup shocks do not aﬀect the eﬃcient level of output. Using the money demand








where  mc =
¡
σ−1 + ω − χηy
¢
denotes the elasticity of the real marginal cost and
ˆ Y e





where ˆ Y n
t is the equilibrium level of output if prices are fully ﬂexible, given a monetary policy
that maintains a constant interest rate spread between monetary and nonmonetary assets. The
(exogenous) process ˆ rn







t+1 − ˆ Y e
t
´
− σ−1 (Et−1gt+1 − gt)
In order to simplify the analysis and consistently with the previous literature I assume that ˆ rn
t
is observable and evolves as an AR(1) process. All variables are in log-levels. This is consistent
with the assumption that the agents do not know the long run equilibrium of the variables, and in
particular the inﬂation target. Notice that current expenditures depend on expectations about the
current and the future interest rate.
26This is not a strong asumption. As mentioned in Evans, Honkapohja and Mitra (2002), running a regression of
consumption on the output gap and government expenditures would reveal what I am assuming.
31Finally, combining (46) with the money demand curve, and using the deﬁnition of eﬃcient
output I obtain the following Phillips curve
πt = Et−1βπt+1 + κEt−1 [ˆ xt + η3 (ˆ ıt −ˆ ım
t )] + ut
where









Et−1ˆ µt. Notice that the shock is pre-determined at time t.
9.1.2 Money in the Production Function
In this case he real marginal cost is
st =
V 0(ht)
f0 (ht,m t)Uc (Yt − Gt)
(51)
Deﬁning
ht = H (Yt,m t)
with Hy > 0 and Hm < 0, it is possible to rewrite (51) as a function of output and money
balances only. Hence,
st =
V 0(H (Yt,m t))
f0 (H (Yt,m t))Uc (Yt − Gt)
.




¢ ˆ Yt + σ−1ˆ gt − ˜ χˆ mt
where
˜ ω =˜ ωw + ωhh























































The Euler equation for consumption and thus the IS equation do not depend on real money
balances. The IS is equivalent to (49) with η1 =1and η2 =0 .
The money demand function can be linearized to yield





˜ ωw + ωhm + ωhh + σ−1




































χvv + χhm + χmm + χhh + χhm
¶
Inserting the demand for money (52) in the real marginal cost equation, I obtain
ˆ st =
¡
σ−1 +˜ ω − ˜ χ˜ ηy
¢ ˆ Yt +˜ χ˜ ηiEt−1 (ˆ ıt −ˆ ım
t )+
¡
σ−1 +˜ χ˜ ηy
¢
ˆ gt
Proceeding as for the case of money in the utility function, it is possible to express the real
marginal cost in terms of deviations of current output from its eﬃcient level
ˆ st =˜  mcˆ Y e
t +˜ χ˜ ηiEt−1 (ˆ ıt −ˆ ım
t )
33where, again, ˜  mc =
¡
σ−1 +˜ ω − ˜ χ˜ ηy
¢






Substituting the real marginal cost in the Phillips curve we get
πt = Et−1βπt+1 +˜ κEt−1 [ˆ xt +˜ η3 (ˆ ıt −ˆ ım
t )] + ˜ ut
where




and ˜ ut is deﬁned as above.
10 Appendix B. Stability With t Expectations.
Proof. Proposition (1)
(i) Local stability is determined by the stability of the following diﬀerential in notional time
dΩ
dτ




ˆ A1 + ˆ A2Ω0, ˆ A2Ω1H + ˆ A3
´
Following Evans and Honkapohja (2001), E-Stability is obtained, provided the following matrices
have eigenvalues with real parts less than one.
ˆ A2 − I3 (53)
and
H ⊗ ˆ A2 − I3 (54)
It is enough to verify the condition for (53), given that ρr,ρ u < 1. The characteristic equation
of (53) can be factorized such that
P(λ)=−(1 + λ)
¡

















˜ σκφπ +˜ σφxη1 +1
34and
a0 =





˜ σκφπ +˜ σφxη1 +1
The conditions to be satisﬁed to obtain stability are
a0 > 0,a 1 > 0
Given that η1 − η3 > 0 and σ ≥ 1,w eh a v et h a ta1 >a 0. Hence, stability obtains if a0 > 0.T h i s
gives condition (12).
Also, when the change of stability occurs, a0 is equal to zero. That means that the eigenvalues
are real. Hence, no local Hopf bifurcation occurs and the inﬂation target is the only equilibrium.
Proof. Proposition (2)
I study the convergence properties of the algorithm by using stochastic approximation theory,
using results by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and Marcet and Sargent (1989). In order to apply
those results, I need to put the system (20) in the following form:
ξt = ξt−1 + δtΦ(ξt−1,S t) (55)
St = G(ξt−1)St−1 + Cνt















where θ is the d-dimensional vector of the estimates, S represents the state vector, ν is the
disturbance term and C its coeﬃcients. The latter two are trivially identiﬁable. The local dynamics
of this system (local convergence), i.e. the stability of the RE equilibrium depend on the associated
ODE:
dθ/dτ = h(θ) (56)
where h(θ)=l i m t→∞ EΦ(θ,St(θ)). An exhaustive survey of this approach with analytical proofs
can be found in Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Given that the system can be put in the in form
35( 5 5 ) ,i ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a ti ts a t i s ﬁes the properties, A.1, A.2, B.1, B.2 in Evans and Honkapohja
(2001).








































          


Substituting (57) in (20) I get





















x0 (θt−1) ˜ T
π0 (θt−1) ˜ T
i0 (θt−1)
´
Rearranging, the system becomes




¡¯ T (θt−1) − K (θt−1)θt−1
¢
+i.i.d. errors
Rt = Rt−1 + δt
¡
QtQ0
tK (θt−1) − Rt−1
¢
By taking the asymptotic mean, the convergence properties can be studied by checking the
stability of the following ODE
dR
dτ





¡¯ T (θ) − K (θ)θ
¢
(59)
where MQ = Elimt→∞ (QtQ0
t).G i v e nt h a t ,f r o mt h eﬁrst equation
R → MQK (θ)






¡¯ T (θ) − K (θ)θ
¢
= K (θ)
−1 ¯ T (θ) − θ
The resulting system is a non-linear function of Γ and B and a complicated expression of the
single parameters. Using Matlab Symbolic Toolbox it is possible to show that the linearized system




























































First, (61) shows that the estimates of the Taylor rule converge for any parameter value. This is
expected, because as I mentioned in the main text, the agents’ equation is correctly speciﬁed at any
point in time. Hence, provided that output and inﬂation stay bounded, the estimates will converge.
Also, it is possible to show that the characteristic equation of (60) is the same as for ˆ A2 −I3 (even
if G0 6= ˆ A2 − I3, so that the matrices are similar).
(ii) The system (62) is more complicated and thus is not possible ﬁnd an analytical solution.
Imposing Ucm =0it is possible to show that the eigenvalues of (54) and G1 are the same so that
the matrixes are similar. For the general case, I had to resort to simulation, as mentioned in the
Proposition. Repeated simulations suggest that G1 and (54) are similar for every parameter value.
(iii) The result trivially depends on the fact that the stability of (60) and (62) do not depend
on the estimates of the policy parameters.
3711 Appendix C. Stability With t-1 Expectations.
Proof. Proposition (3)
The model can be written in matrix form as





t−1Vt+1 + A3Xt +  t (63)













+  t (64)













































1 + A3H − ΩPS
2 (68)

































1 − I3 + A2 ACB
1
APS







1 + H ⊗ A2 − I6 I2 ⊗ ACB
1
I2 ⊗ APS




38In order to extract the stability conditions I follow Honkapohja and Mitra (2002). Stability
under learning is obtained if the eigenvalues of F1 and F2 have negative real parts. The characteristic
equations of associated to the two matrices can be simpliﬁed to
|F1 − λI6| =
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
¯
APS
1 − I3 (1 + λ)+A2 ACB
1
APS
1 + A2 ACB
1 − I3 (1 + λ)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
¯
(73)
=( −(1 + λ))
2 ¯ ¯APS
1 + ACB
1 + A2 − I3 (1 + λ)
¯ ¯
and
|F2 − λI12| =
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
−(1 + λ)I6 (1 + λ)I6
I2 ⊗ APS
1 + H ⊗ A2 I2 ⊗ ACB
1 − I6 (1 + λ)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(74)
=( −(1 + λ))
6 ¯ ¯I2 ⊗ APS
1 + H ⊗ A2 + I2 ⊗ ACB
1 − (1 + λ)I6
¯ ¯
So, determining stability boils down to determinate whether the eigenvalues of the following
matrices have negative real part
˜ A1 = APS
1 + ACB




0˜ σ −˜ σ






˜ A2 = APS
1 + ACB
1 + ρiA2 (76)
for i = r,u.
Let us consider ﬁrst (75). According to the Routh’s Theorem, the number of roots of (75) with
positive real parts is equal to the number of variations of sign in the following scheme
−1 Trace ( ˜ A1) − B1 +
Det( ˜ A1)
Trace ( ˜ A1)
Det( ˜ A1)( 7 7 )
where
Trace ( ˜ A1)= β − 2 < 0 (78)
Det( ˜ A1)= − [κ(φπ − 1) + (1 − β)φx]+η3κφx < 0 (79)
provided (22) holds (80)
B1 = −κσ + σφx +( 1− β) − η3κφπ (81)
39where B is the sum of all second order principle minors of ˜ A1. A pattern of −−−−corresponds
to all eigenvalues having negative real part. In order to obtain that we need
−B1 · Trace ( ˜ A1) + Det( ˜ A1)>0( 8 2 )
Algebraic manipulations show that (82) is positive if φx > ˆ φx in the Proposition is veriﬁed.
Consider the matrix ˜ A2. It is easy to show that
Trace ( ˜ A2)= ρi (1 + β) − 3 < 0 (83)
Det( ˜ A2)= − ˜ σ [κ(φπ − ρi)+φx (1 − βρi)(η1 − ρiη2)] + (84)
−κ(1 − ρi)(˜ ση1 − η3) − (1 − ρi)(2− βρi) < 0 (85)
provided (22) holds
B2 = −κρiσ +( η1 − ρiη2)σφy +2− β (1 + ρi)+ (86)
(1 − ρi)(1− βρi) − η3κφπ
Assume (22) holds. SinceB2 ≥ B1, Det( ˜ A2)≤Det( ˜ A1)a n dT r a c e(˜ A2)≤Trace ( ˜ A1), −B2·Trace
( ˜ A2)+Det( ˜ A2)>0, if (82) is satisﬁed. So that provided that φx > ˆ φx, the REE is stable under
learning.
(ii) Notice that if (82) is not veriﬁed the sign pattern becomes −−+−, which indicates two
eigenvalues with positive real parts. Since, the determinant of ˜ A1 does not vanish at ˆ φx,w ek n o w
that the eigenvalues are complex.






2 has eigenvalues inside the unit circle. The
characteristic equation can be factorized to give
P (λ)=−λ
¡





η2κφπ + κη3φx + κ + η2φy + βφxη1
¢
˜ σ − κη3φπ +1+β
(κη1φπ + φxη1)˜ σ +1− κη3φπ
and
a0 =
β(1 + φxη2˜ σ)
(κη1φπ + φxη1)˜ σ +1− κη3φπ
The conditions for determinacy are
|a0| < 1, |a1| < 1+a0
40The ﬁrst condition is veriﬁed, given that η1˜ σ>η 3. Notice that the denominator is positive,
provided η1 >η 3 and σ ≥ 1. Also, imposing the condition mentioned in the main text we have
that a1 < 0, so that the condition for determinacy becomes
−a1 < 1+a0
which gives (12).
Finally, local unicity of the equilibrium comes from the fact that indeterminacy occurs as
−a1 =1+a0. Hence the eigenvalues are real at the bifurcation point so that there is no Hopf
bifurcation. Moreover, the maximum eigenvalue is positive, so that we can exclude a ﬂip bifurcation.
This implies that no other equilibria exist close to the inﬂation target.
Proof. Proposition (4)
(i) Consider ﬁrst the convergence properties of the policy rule estimates. Assume that the
central bank and the private sector have the same expectations. This is without loss of generality,
from the results above. Then substituting the expectations in the Taylor rule we get
Proof.




















where φ denotes the true policy coeﬃcients. This can be rearranged to yield





φ − ψt−1 +  t
¢






The corresponding ODE is
˙ ψ = R−1
ψ M ˜ Ω0 (φ − ψ)
˙ Rψ =
³
M ˜ Ω0 − Rψ
´
where M = Et→∞WtW0
t. Hence, we have that Rψ → M ˜ Ω0. Substituting in the above we obtain
φ → ψ. Consider the other coeﬃcients. The updating mechanism is
˜ Ω0




˜ Vt − ˜ Ωt−1Wt−1
i0
(87)





It is possible to express (87) as
˜ Ω0


















t−1˜ Ωt−1 + B2˜ Ωt−1 + B3ψ0
t−1˜ Ωt−1H + B4˜ Ωt−1H + ¯ B5
´
˜ Vt = B0 + B1ψ0
t−1ECB
t−1 ˜ Vt + B2EPS
t−1˜ Vt + B3ψ0
t−1ECB
t−1 ˜ Vt+1 + B4EPS
t−1˜ Vt+1 + B5Xt−1 + ζt (89)
it =¯ ı + φπECB
t−d(πt − π∗)+φxECB
t−d (xt − x∗)+ t
It is then possible to rearrange (88) into
˜ Ω0
























w h e r eIu s et h ef a c tt h a t ,a )R → M;b )φ → ψ. It is straightforward to show that stability
under learning depends on the eigenvalues of the following matrix
˜ B1 + ˜ B2 − I2 =
"









˜ B1 + ρi ˜ B2 − I2 (91)
where
˜ B1 = B1φ0 + B2; ˜ B2 = B3φ0 + B4
In order to have negative eigenvalues, I need both the trace and the determinant to be negative.
Consider the case Ucm =0 . It is straightforward to show that the eigenvalues of the matrix (90)
are negative provided the Taylor Principle holds. Also it is possible to show that if the matrix
(91) satisﬁes this property, then also matrix (90) will satisfy it. Furthermore, the determinant of
˜ B1+ ˜ B2−(1 + λ)I2 vanishes if the Taylor condition holds with equality. Hence the eigenvalues are
real and no Hobf bifurcation occur.






˜ Ω0 ˜ B0
1 + H˜ Ω0 ˜ B0
2 − ˜ Ω0
i





=( ( M ⊗ I3))
h³









42Using the fact that M is diagonal I can re-express the matrix as
³








˜ B1 + ρu ˜ B2 − I3
´
where I need to adjust notation for the constant and m1,m2 are the elements of M on the
diagonal. Given the fact that by deﬁnition m1,m2 are positive, the stability condition is identical
to the case with RLS.








−M ˜ Ω0 (φ − ψ)
0 ⊗ M








CC = B1ψ0 ⊗ M + B2 ⊗ M + B3ψ0 ⊗ MH+ B4 ⊗ MH− I ⊗ M







−M ˜ Ω∗0 0





Stability conditions depend on the eigenvalues of the matrices −M ˜ Ω∗0 and ˜ B1 ⊗ M + ˜ B2 ⊗
HM − I ⊗ M. Hence, from the results in (ii), the Taylor principle it is not suﬃcient for stability
of the REE.
(iii) Consider the case where Ucm > 0. In this case the trace is negative if φx˜ σ+1−β−κη3φπ > 0.
This implies that also in the case of full transparency a policy rule that does not react to the
output gap is destabilizing. Nevertheless transparency increases the set of rules that are robust to
expectational mistakes. In order to show this, notice that (82) implies
φx˜ σ +1− β − κη3φπ > ˜ σ
κ + κ(φπ − 1) + φx (1 − β) − κη3φx
2 − β
> 0
which is a more stringent condition for stability than in the case of full transparency. Combining
the stability conditions for the case of transparency, I obtain the condition (29)
Proof. Proposition (5)
(i) the characteristic equation in the case of no transparency can be written as
P (λ)=( 1+λ)
¡
λ2 + a1 + a0
¢
where
a1 = φx˜ σ +( 1− β) − κη3φπ
a0 = κ(φπ − 1) + φx (1 − β) − κη3φx
43I tc a nb ee a s i l yv e r i ﬁed that the same condition can be found imposing full transparency,
following the same step as in the proof above.
(ii) this is equivalent to set φx =0in (5).
(iii) I assume ρr = ρu =0 , in order to simplify the proof. Consistently with the ﬁndings in
the previous proofs, I expect the result would not change for positive autoregressive components.
Under the current assumptions, the stability under learning depends on the eigenvalues of (75).
(iv) Under the current assumptions, the stability under learning depends on the eigenvalues of
(90).
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